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Abstract 
A large number of pairs of countries exhibit a dynamic pattern in which: (i) Fertility in 
both countries declines across time; (ii) Initially one country has higher fertility and 
lower per-capita income compared to the other; (iii) In time, as per-capita income 
converges, fertility rates in the poorer country become lower than in the richer one.  
This paper provides statistics on the prevalence of such dynamics and a 
theoretical model in which these dynamics emerge endogenously. Assuming that 
countries differ in the degree of utility substitution between consumption and rearing 
children is sufficient to generate all three components of these dynamics. 
 
 
Key words: Fertility, Human Capital, Economic Growth. 
 
J. E. L. Classification: J11, J13, O40.   1
1. Introduction 
In 1965 the output per capita ratio between Spain and the UK was 0.463. By the year 
2000 this ratio rose to 0.807. A switch of the “Fertility Dominance” between these two 
countries accompanied this convergence: The World Bank data show that until 1984 
the total fertility rate (TFR) in Spain was higher than in the UK, but since then the TFR 
in the UK exceeds that of Spain. Since fertility in both countries has been mostly 













Figure 1: Total Fertility Rates (TFR) in Spain and the UK. Source: World Bank data. 
 
More World Bank data, analyzed in detail in section 2 of this paper, show that 
such a joint output and fertility dynamics can be found among a substantial number of 
pairs of countries. In this paper I show how a single factor can be responsible for the   2
three different components of these “Backslanted X” fertility dynamics in which: 
Fertility in both countries A and B declines across time; initially A has a higher fertility 
and lower output per capita than B; later, fertility in A becomes lower in B as output 
converges. Specifically, this factor is that the individuals in A have a stronger 
preference for consumption, rather than for rearing and educating children, compared 
to their counterparts in B. 
Although the endogenous growth literature offers many articles trying to 
account for the observed fertility dynamics, the “Backslanted X” fertility dynamics has 
not been noticed by this literature yet.
1,2 The utter majority of the growth literature 
theoretical articles predict a negative link across time between fertility rates and per-
capita output.
3 Therefore, these articles can account for the “Backslanted X” fertility 
dynamics only if they assume, as done in the current paper, cross country differences in 
model parameters, rather than in initial conditions.  
  In the theoretical model developed in this paper the co-existence of 
endogenous consumption, investment and fertility severely limits the ability to analyze 
in detail the transition towards the steady state, which is an essential part of the 
Backslanted X dynamics.
4 Thus, several simplifying assumptions are taken in the 
current model, making the accumulation of human capital the sole source of growth. 
This growth process is gradual since acquiring education is assumed costly, where the 
                                                  
1For theoretical articles that study the dynamics of fertility treating it as an endogenous variable and 
analyzing its dynamics within a dynamic macroeconomic framework see for example Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura (1990), Galor and Weil (1996, 2000), Galor and Moav (2002) and Moav (2004).  
2 Several studies have come near the “Backslanted X” fertility dynamics when dealing with the 
reversal of the relationship between fertility and female labor participation among OECD countries. 
This relation was negative until the beginning of the 1980s but has turned positive since. See for 
example Del Boca (2002), Adserà (2004) and Apps and Rees (2004). Some of these studies merely 
document this reversal and others also provide explanations for the recent positive link, but none of 
them tries to explain the transition from the previous negative link to the current positive one. 
3 Several article, e.g., Galor and Weil (2000) do find that that income effects may generate a positive 
link between per-capita output and fertility. This positive relation, however, is limited to the early 
stages of growth and, therefore, is not relevant to the current paper.  
4 See for example Barro and Becker (1989) who study the large country case, unlike the simpler case 
analyzed here, and restrict themselves therefore to an analysis of the dynamics around the steady state.   3
total cost of education increases with the amount of education acquired. Following 
Galor and Weil (1996) I assume that the cost of rearing children is increasing in the 
parent’s income. This assumption makes the fertility rates decline as the economies 
grow. It is also assumed that individuals derive utility from consumption, from the 
number of children they have and from the future welfare of these children, which 
depends on their education. Assuming the individuals in countries A and B differ, 
ceteris paribus, in the degree of the substitution in utility between current family 
consumption and offspring future welfare, generates the dynamics described above.  
  Its weaker preference for consumption implies that country B has a stronger 
preference for investing in children education, which makes it grow faster than A. 
Therefore, in the initial stages of growth the individuals in the richer economy B 
choose to have fewer children, compared to country A individuals. Later in time, as 
incomes in country A gradually catch up with those in B, the effect that the income 
differences exert on fertility decrease. At this stage the dominant effect on the fertility 
ranking is the country A individuals’ stronger preference for consumption. 
Since the paper focuses on the fertility dynamics of the last few decades, the 
relevant growth in education for most OECD and middle income countries is the 
growth in secondary and tertiary education. Table 1 shows the large increase in 
secondary schooling enrolment during the few past decades. As the table shows, even 
in 1970 secondary schooling enrolment still did not exceed seventy percent in 
developed countries such as the UK, France or Norway. The relevant education costs 
in this case are the secondary and tertiary schooling tuition and forgone labor earnings 
of young individuals in the secondary education ages and above.
5  
                                                  
5 Note however that International Labor Organization data show non-negligible rates of child labor 
(out of the entire population aged 10-14) in 1960 even in countries like Austria (7%), Spain (7.7%), 
Italy (10.9%), Greece (15.1%) and Portugal (22%).   4
  Section 2 shows some statistics on the prevalence of the Backslanted x fertility 
dynamics. In section 3 a dynamic macroeconomic model is presented and its 
equilibrium and dynamics are analyzed. To deliver the argument of this paper in the 
most efficient way I use a version of the Hazan and Berdugo (2002) model. Unlike 
Hazan and Berdugo (2002), the current paper is not aiming at generating multiple 
steady state equilibria and therefore certain simplifications were inserted here into their 
model. In section 4 the model’s implications for the dynamics of cross-country fertility 
differences is analyzed and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Statistics on the Dynamics of Cross-Country Fertility Differences  
In order to learn about the prevalence of this type of fertility dynamics some data were 
collected for the fifty countries with the highest per-capita gdp in 1975 among the 
countries for which the World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 1975 
and 2000. Countries with population less than 100,000 were taken out of the sample. 
In all of the countries in the sample, except for the USA, fertility, measured by the 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has decreased over that period.  
  Table 2 shows a mobility matrix for the rankings of the TFR between 1975 and 
2000. As the table shows, only two countries, Germany and Austria, were among the 
ten countries with the lowest fertility both in 1975 and in 2000. A great deal of 
mobility is expressed by the fact that the cells along the main diagonal of this matrix 
contain less than five countries and none of them is the largest in its row, with the 
exception of the lowest row. Of particular interest might be two large jumps from the 
first tenth (ranks 1-10): One to the third tenth (ranks 21-30) by Luxemburg and 
another to the fourth tenth (ranks 31-40) by the USA. Also note the large jump from 
the third tenth to the first tenth made by four countries: Hong-Kong, Spain, Hungary   5
and Greece. The relatively large number of seven countries in the bottom tenth in both 
periods is due to the fact that this is the last row of this matrix and not an indication of 
decreasing mobility along the ranking.  
Not limiting the sample to countries for which the World Bank offers GDP 
data for 1975 would allow into the sample the transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. However, the World Bank provides 1975 TFR data for these 
countries and using this data here would strengthen substantially the already large 
mobility in the matrix. In fact, the entire lowest fertility tenth in the year 2000 would 
consist of eight such countries (together with Italy and Hong Kong) while in 1975 
none of them enters that tenth.   
  To show how unique is this mobility in the fertility ranking Tables 3, 4 and 5 
show similar matrices for the mobility in the rankings of per-capita output (measured 
by constant 1995 US $), Female Labor force participation (as a percentage of the 15-
64 female age group), and schooling (measured by net enrollment in secondary 
schooling), respectively. In almost all of these fifty countries these three variables have 
increased between 1975 and 2000.  
  Table 6 presents the results of an ols regression, based on this sample, which 
shows that the TFR in the year 2000 is negatively correlated with per-capita GDP in 
2000, but also positively correlated with per-capita GDP in 1975. Both signs are highly 
significant. While the negative sign of per-capita GDP in 2000 is consistent with the 
standard results of most models of fertility and growth, the positive sign of per-capita 
GDP in 1975 implies a large prevalence of the “Backslanted X” fertility dynamics. 
Specifically, this negative sign implies that being a “slow grower” (as Spain is with 
respect to the UK, for example) is associated with lower fertility.    6
  There are 1225 different pairs of countries in this sample. In each pair denote 
the countries by A and B, where A is the country with the higher 2000 per-capita GDP 
in that pair. Let τ denote the year in which A’s per-capita GDP has been the closest to 
B’s 2000 per-capita GDP among the years 1960-2000. For 803 of the 1225 possible 
pairs A’s TFR in year τ is larger than B’s TFR in 2000. Such a magnitude can imply 
that neutralizing the wealth effect reveals that the richer countries have a stronger 
preference for having children. However, such a magnitude can also imply that there is 
a time trend, independent of output dynamics, of lowered fertility.  
 
 
3. The Model 
Consider a small, open, overlapping-generations economy that operates in a perfectly 
competitive world and faces a given world interest rate. Time is infinite and discrete.  
 
3.1 Production 
In every period the economy produces a single good that can be used for either 
consumption or investment. Two factors of production exist in the economy: physical 
capital and efficiency units of labor. The production function satisfies the neo-classical 
assumptions and given by: 
 
(1)   Qt = F(Kt, Lt) = Ltf(kt),  
 
where Kt and Lt are the period t amounts of physical capital and labor efficiency units 
in the economy, respectively, kt ≡ Kt/Lt and f(kt) ≡ F(kt, 1). Given these assumptions 
the firms’ inverse demand for capital is the function:   7
 
(2)     () t k f r ' = , 
 
where r is the world interest rate. From (2) it follows that: 
 
(3)   kt =  () k r f =
−1 '.  
 
Since  F(Kt,  Lt) satisfies the neo-classical assumptions it also holds that the 
return to one efficiency unit of labor satisfies: 
 




In each period t a generation of individuals is born and lives for three periods. Each 
individual has a single parent. Individuals within a generation are identical in their 
preferences. A generation born at a certain period t–1 is denoted “generation t”. In eac 
period each individual is endowed with a single time unit 
In their first life period (t–1), the members of generation t are children. The 
parent of each child allocates a fraction denoted by τt-1 of the child’s time to schooling. 
Each schooling unit costs h output units.
6   
                                                  
6 As was discussed in the introduction, an important part of the schooling costs spring from secondary 
schooling tuition, which is government financed in most countries during the past few decades, and 
the forgone earnings of uneducated young individuals. Thus, not assuming that the cost of a unit of 
education increases with the growth in incomes [as done for example by Dahan and Tsidon (1998), or 
by Maoz and Moav (1999)] is merely a weak simplification. A version of the current paper where the 
price of education is an increasing concave function of adults' income yields the same qualitative 
results and available from author.    8
In their second life period (t), the members of generation t are adults. They 
work, have children and save. Each such individual divides this time unit between 
rearing children and working. The amount of efficiency units each of them has is 
denoted et and is an increasing function of the amount of schooling this individual has 
received as a child. Specifically: 
 
(5)   et = 1 + bτt-1, 
 
where b > 0. Thus if a member of generation t allocates her entire period t time to 
working she will earn the amount It, given by: 
 
(6)   It = etw = (1 + bτt-1)w. 
 
In their final life period (t + 1), the members of generation t consume their savings.  
Individuals derive utility from consumption, from the number of children they 
have and from the potential future income of their children (namely I t+1). The 
preferences of each member of generation t are given by:     
 
(7)   Ut = αln(Ct+1) +βln(nt) + γln(It+1), 
 
where nt denotes the number of children each member of generation t has. Rearing 
children cost the fraction z of each adult’s time. Thus, each member of generation t 
works in period t for 1 – znt time units, implying that nt must be constrained to being 
less than 1/z. The resulting constraint on the consumption of a generation t individual 
whose potential income is It is:   9
 
(8)     Ct+1 = () () ( ) [] h n I zn r S r t t t t t τ − − + = + + 1 1 1 1 . 
 
  Note that the term in the square brackets is the income this generation t 
individual acquires in period t: its first term is the income this individual receives from 




Each member of generation t decides how many children (nt) to have and how much 
schooling (τt) to give to each of these children so as to maximize the utility function 
given in (7), given her potential income, It, and subject to (5), (6), (8), 0 ≤ nt < 1/z and 
0 ≤ τt ≤ 1. In order to avoid some undesired solutions to the optimization problem 
several assumptions shall be now taken. 
 
Assumption 1: β > γ. This assumption is required to make the offspring’s amount of 









*. By making the time cost attached to the quantity of 
children, z, sufficiently large, this assumption ensures that the quality of children would 
be sufficiently large too. Specifically, it ensures that τt > 0 at each period even if the 
parent has the lowest possible potential income. Although this assumption and its 
consequences are not important to the objective of this paper it simplifies the analysis 
significantly.    10
 






β γ β + −
<  ≡ z
**. Note that z
** > z
* since β > γ. Making the cost 
on the quantity of children sufficiently small eliminates the case where although the 
parental income is the lowest possible, It = w, parents choose the maximal amount of 
schooling for their children, τt = 1.  
  Given these assumptions, the optimal solution for τt and nt is: 
 



































































Assumption 1, together with It > w and Assumption 2 ensure that τt and nt are 
strictly positive. Also note that τt is increasing in It and that nt is decreasing in It.
7 
Assumption 3 ensures that I
* > w, implying that the economy can indeed be in the 
range It < I
*. Showing that nt < 1/z holds when It > I
* is trivial. To see that nt < 1/z 
holds also when It < I
* note that: 
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where the second inequality follows from Assumption 1. This leads to: 
 
(12)   ()
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Note that in the range 0 < τt-1 < τ
* the slope of this dynamical function exceeds 
unity since z > z
* and β > γ. The intercept of this dynamical function is between zero 
and unity due to z
* < z < z
**. In addition, note that τ
* < 1, due to z
* < z < z
**. The 
economic meaning of these results follows directly from the economic meaning of 
assumption 1 to 3 discussed in section 3.3. In addition, it follows from these results 
that the dynamical system has a unique and stable steady state equilibrium at τ = 1. 
Figure 2 shows this system. 
The value of n in this steady state equilibrium, denoted n , is given by the 
lower row of (10). 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Note that τt is independent of α. This is not an important result but merely a by-product of the 












Figure 2: The dynamical system. 
 
4. Fertility Dominance  
Let 
i
t n and 
j
t n denote the period t fertility rates in countries i and j ,  respectively. 




t n n > . The 
following analysis shows how the fertility dominance can shift from country A to B as 
country A’s income per-capita approaches that of B. To make the analysis more 
efficient I assume that in both countries α + β + γ = 1. I also assume that τ0 = 0 in both 
economies. A slower growth of A with respect to B shall be achieved by assuming that 
α
A > α
B which implies that the individuals in A have a stronger taste for consumption 
compared to those in B. It is assumed that β is identical in both countries. This implies 
that γ
A < γ









 Since  0 0 0 = =
B A τ τ , 
A
1 τ  and 
B
1 τ  are both below unity, as was shown in sub-
section 3.4. It follows from (9) that in that range τt is increasing in γ. Thus, 
A B
1 1 τ τ >  
because γ
A < γ
B. In periods later than t = 1 the schooling and income differences in 
favor of country B widen because in those periods the income effect is added to the 
preferences effect on schooling. This is captured by the result that the slope of the 
dynamical function exceeds unity and limited to the stage where τt-1 < τ
*. 
  To study the dynamics of fertility during the stage where τt-1 < τ
* it is useful to 
present the formula for nt in the upper raw of (10) as the multiplication of two factors. 
The first one, the fraction in the left side, shall be referred to as the “preferences 
factor”, since it merely depends on the parameters of the utility function, and since 
these parameters do not appear in the second factor, the fraction in the right side. This 
second factor shall be therefore referred to as the “constraints factor”. The preferences 
factor is positive since β > γ  and also increasing in α, as follows from standard 
differentiation bearing in mind that dγ/dα = -1. The constraints factor is positive and 




t n n > already in period 1, since α
A > α
B and despite the 
assumption that the parental incomes are the same in these economies in that period. In 




t n n − , increases as the effect of the increasing income 
gap on the constraints factor is added to the preferences effect.  
  At a certain period country B reaches its steady state equilibrium while country 
A is still growing. At this stage, the income gap, and therefore the fertility gap too, 
narrows. Eventually country A too approaches its steady state equilibrium. At this final 
stage schooling is at its maximal level, τ = 1, in both countries and incomes are 
therefore identical too. Thus the fertility difference in the steady state depends only on 
the relative magnitude of β, with respect to α. Country A has therefore a lower value   14
of β, relative to its α, and therefore lower steady state fertility. This can be seen by 
noticing from the lower raw in (10) that the level of steady state fertility, n , is 
decreasing in α.  
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have shown that if the individuals in country A have a stronger 
preference for consumption over rearing children, compared to the individuals in 
country B, then the following dynamics might arise: A’s growth of output per capita 
would be slower than B’s; Initially, the fertility rates in A would be higher than in B; 
Later, as the output gap narrows, the fertility rate in A is lower than the fertility rate in 
B. Thus, based on this analysis, it is possible that the same reason for third world 
countries to have higher fertility today is the same one that would make them have 
lower fertility than the currently already developed economies, once a sufficient level 
of income convergence would be reached .  
  The difference between countries in individual utility parameters is taken in this 
paper as given. The important task of accounting for such differences, for example – 
by presenting them as norms and convention that rose endogenously in the past and 
persist onwards to the time of the fertility dynamics upon which the paper focuses, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
For generating growth speed differences between economies I have assumed 
that individuals derive utility not merely from consumption and child quantity, but also 
from child quality, and that investment in child quality is the source of growth in these 
economies. Thus, the stronger taste for consumption in A made its growth slower, 
compared to B. An alternative mechanism that generates such output and fertility 
dynamics can be based on having investment in physical capital or in research and   15
development as the source of growth. In such a model, assuming that the individuals in 
A have a stronger preference for present over future consumption, compared to 
individuals in B, would generate similar qualitative dynamics. Such modeling, however, 
would severely limit the ability to go beyond a steady state analysis and efficiently 
analyze the dynamic path towards the steady state, as the phenomena this paper 
addresses requires.     16
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                            1970    2000 
Argentina   34 79 
Austria    69  88 
Brazil    17  69 
Chile    28  75 
Finland   71  95 
France    66  92 
Japan    86  100 
Korea Rep.    38  91 
Luxembourg   45  80 
Mexico  17  58 
Netherlands   69  90 
New Zealand    76  92 
Norway  65  95 
Portugal   30  85 
Spain    40  93 
United Kingdom  67  95 
 
Table 1: Secondary schooling gross enrolment rates (%) in 1970 and 2000 in 
selected countries.  
   18
 
              2000 
    1975
1-10  11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 
1-10  2  6 1 1 0 
11-20  3  3  4 0 0 
21-30  4 1 3  2 0 
31-40  1 0 2 4  3 
41-50  0 0 0 3 7 
 
Table 2: Total Fertility rate (TFR) ranking mobility between 1975 and 2000 for the 
fifty countries with the highest per-capita GDP among the countries for which the 
World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 1975 and 2000.   
 
 
              2000 
    1975
1-10 11-20  21-30 31-40  41-50 
1-10  7  1 1 1  0 
11-20  3  6  1 0 0 
21-30  0 3 4  2 1 
31-40  0 0 3 5  2 
41-50  0 0 0 2 8 
 
Table 3: Per-capita GDP (in constant 1995 US$) ranking mobility between 1975 and 
2000 for the fifty countries with the highest per-capita GDP among the countries for 
which the World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 1975 and 2000.   
   19
 
              2000 
    1975
1-10  11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 
1-10  6  4 0 0 0 
11-20  3  4  3 0 0 
21-30  1 2 6  1 0 
31-40  0 0 1 8  1 
41-50  0 0 0 1 9 
 
Table 4: Female labor force participation (as a percentage of the female age 15-64 
population) ranking mobility between 1975 and 2000 for the fifty countries with the 
highest per-capita GDP among the countries for which the World Bank provides 
fertility and output data for both 1975 and 2000.   
 
 
              1990s 
    1970s
1-10  11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 
1-10  7  2 1 0 0 
11-20  3  5  2 0 0 
21-30  1 2 5  1 1 
31-40  0 1 1 7  1 
41-50  0 0 1 2 7 
 
Table 5: Gross enrollment in secondary schooling ranking mobility between the 1970s 
and the 1990s for the fifty countries with the highest per-capita GDP among the 
countries for which the World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 1975 
and 2000. For the 1970s the average of the World Bank data for the years 1970 until 
1980 was taken for each country. For the 1990s the average of the World Bank data 
for the years 1997 until 2002 was taken for each country. 










Table 6: An ols regression results where TFR in the year 2000 is the dependant 
variable and the independent variables are the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP in 
the years 2000 and 1975. Oil is a dummy variable for the five Persian-gulf countries in 
the sample. The sample contains fifty countries with the highest per-capita GDP among 
the countries for which the World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 
1975 and 2000. 
  Coefficient P-Value 
Y2000  -0.35 0.0001 
Y1975  0.22 0.0169 
Oil  0.35 0.0084 
b = 50  R
2 = 0.55  Adjusted R
2 = 0.53 